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SELF-CONTAINED SELF-RESCUER FIELD EVALUATION: 
RESULTS FROM 1982-90 
By Nicholas Kyriazi1 and John P. Shubilla2 
ABSTRACT 
A joint effort by the U.S. Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(MSHA) was undertaken to determine how well self-contained self-rescuers (SCSR's), deployed in 
accordance with Federal regulations (30 CFR 75.1714), survived the underground environment with 
regard to both impact damage and aging. This report presents fmdings regarding laboratory-tested 
SCSR's from 1982 through 1990. The SCSR's were tested on human subjects and on a breathing and 
metabolic simulator (BMS). These results indicate that most of the apparatus, if they pass their in-
spection criteria, perform as expected except for units with manufacturing defects or design deficiencies. 
However, when the apparatus are carried in and out of the mine daily and stored at the working section, 
they may suffer abuse. Physical signs of abuse, unless extremely obvious, are frequently not detected 
by the miners or mine operators. This poses a potential danger to a user in an emergency. Recom-
mendations include improved training in inspection procedures. 
lBiomedical engineer. 
2Engineering technician. 
Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 21, 1981, coal mine operators in the United 
States were required to make available to each under-
ground coal miner a self-contained self-rescuer (SCSR). 
The regulations (30 CFR 75.1714) require that each per-
son in an underground coal mine wear, carry, or have 
immediate access to a device that provides respiratory 
protection with an O2 source for at least 1 h, as rated by 
the certifying agency, the National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health (NIOSH). To ensure the safety 
of miners using these apparatus in an emergency, the 
U.S. Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Mine Safety and 
Health Administration (MSHA) are conducting a long-
term, in-mine evaluation of SCSR's now deployed in 
underground coal mines. In this study, MSHA's respon-
sibility is to identify the participating mines and to procure 
from those mines the SCSR's to be tested. The Bureau 
replaces the SCSR's to be tested with new apparatus and 
tests the SCSR's in its laboratories. The objective of this 
long-term pro~am is to evaluate the in-mine, operational 
durability of SCSR's. Of utmost concern is the successful 
performance of any SCSR that passes its manufacturer's 
inspection criteria. The Bureau is interested only in appa-
ratus that pass their inspection criteria. Such apparatus 
are relied upon to function successfully in an emergency. 
Apparatus that fail inspection criteria are expected to be 
removed from service. 
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
This program involves testing approximately 100 SCSR's 
in each phase of the study. This report describes fmdings 
over the first 8 years of deployment, in which more than 
300 apparatus were tested in 3 phases. Testing was con-
ducted using a breathing and metabolic simulator (BMS) 
and human subjects on a treadmill. 
The SCSR's tested were manufactured by CSE Corp.; 
Draegerwerk AG; Mine Safety Appliances Co., Inc. 
(MSA); Ocenco, Inc.; and Portable Air Supply Systems 
Corp. (PASS) and were sampled according to market 
share (table 1). The sampling was modified to ensure that 
at least 10 SCSR's from each manufacturer were sampled 
for each phase of the program. 
Table 1.-Self-contalned self-rescuers received for evaluation 
Estimated Quantity inspeoted 
Apparatus market share, Phase Phase Phase 
pot 1 2 3 
CSE AU-9A1 ......... 20 26 17 24 
Draeger OXY-SR 60B .. 21 21 17 23 
MSA 60-min SCSR .... 4 15 12 12 
Ocenoo EBA 6.5 ...... 54 44 38 47 
PASS 700 ........... 1 10 21 0 
Total .•.......... 100 116 105 106 
Apparatus were not tested if they failed to pass in-
spection criteria or had a manufacturing defect or design 
deficiency that prevented testing. 
MSHA selected the participating mines with regard 
to type of mining operation, seam height, and SCSR de-
ployment mode to obtain a representative cross section 
of U.S. mines. 
The researchers planned to conduct 90 pct of the tests 
using the BMS and 10 pct using human subjects. During 
phase 1 (1983-84) the old BMS was replaced with a newer 
design. For a period, no BMS was available, so human-
subject testing was relied upon exclusively. Approximately 
half the apparatus were tested on the BMS in phase 1 and 
the remainder were tested on five human subjects, whose 
weights are given in table 2. Phases 2 and 3 were conduct-
ed according to the target of 90 pct BMS tests and 10 pct 
human-subject tests. 
Table 2.-Weights of human 
subjects for treadmill 
tests, phase 1 
Subject Weightr kg 
A......... 64 B......... 82 
C......... 64 
D......... 93 
E......... 80 
The human-subject test consisted of the treadmill equiv-
alent of the 1-h man test 4 from 30 CFR 11. The BMS 
test consisted of the average metabolic work rate exhibited 
by the 50th-percentile miner weighing 87 kg while per-
forming the 1-h man test 4. The metabolic workload (vol-
umes at standard pressure and temperature, dry (STPD» 
is given in table 3. The breath waveform shape of the first 
BMS was a sine wave. 
In phase 2, during 1985 and 1986, two human subjects 
were used in the treadmill tests. The subjects walked on 
t 
I 
I 
I 
! 
the treadmill at whatever speed resulted in an O2 con-
sumption rate of 1.35 L/min (STPD). Their weights and 
speeds are listed in table 4. Keeping the O2 consumption 
rate constant for the different human subjects and the 
same as that of the BMS made the data from each human 
subject and the BMS more comparable. When different 
human subjects perform the same activity (l-h man test 4 
in phase 1), O2 consumption rates vary with weight, physi-
cal condition, and genetic differences. 
Table 3.-BMS metabolic workload for phase 1 
02 consumption rate .......•...... Llmin . . 1.35 
CO2 production rate ..............• Llmin . . 1.30 
Ventilation rate ............ ; ...... Llmin . . 31.9 
Tidal volume .....•......... L per breath. . 1.21 
Respiratory frequency .,... breaths per min. . 26.5 
Peak respiratory flow rate ........... Llmin . . 100 
BMS Breathing and metabolic simulator. 
Table 4.-Weights and speeds of 
human subjects for treadmill 
tests, phase 2 
Subject 
A ...... .. 
B ...... .. 
Weight, kg 
64 
82 
Speed, mls 
1.8 
1.6 
The new BMS was used in phase 2. Although the met-
abolic workload and breath waveform shape (sine wave) 
were the same as in the first phase, the difference in de-
sign between the two BMS's makes the data between 
them incomparable. See Bureau IC 911()3 for detailed de-
scriptions of the designs of the old manual Reimers BMS 
and the new DEEC Inc. automated ,BMS. 
In phase 3, during 1987 and 1988, the breath waveform 
used in the BMS testing was more humanlike, with lower 
peak flow rates than a sine wave generates for the sallle 
ventilation rate. In addition, while the same O2 consump-
tion rate was used, the other parameters of the metabolic 
workload were somewhat different, more closely resem-
bling the human subjects (table 5). The human-subject 
testing procedure was not changed from that used in 
phase 2. The weights and speeds of the six human sub-
jects are listed in table 6. 
In all phases of the study, the parameters monitored 
were CO2, O2, temperature, and breathing pressures in 
3Kyriazi, N. Development of an Automated Breathing and Metabolic 
Simulator. BuMines Ie 9110, 1986, 17 pp. 
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both the EMS and treadmill testing. In the BMS testing, 
however, average inhaled levels of CO2 and O2 were meas-
ured as well as minimum levels of CO2, whereas only 
minimum levels of CO2 and maximum levels of Oz were 
measured in the treadmill testing. Average inhaled gas 
levels reflect the overall quantity of gas inhaled, including 
the effect of apparatus dead space, whereas minimum 
values of COz, for example, reflect only the best perform-
ance of the scrubber. The BMS measures average inhaled 
values by summing electronically (new BMS) or mechani-
cally (old BMS) all of the inhaled COz and Oz from the 
beginning to the end of each inhalation, as described in 
RI 9110. Maximum inhaled dry-bulb gas temperature was 
measured in phases 1 and 2, whereas end-of-inhalation, 
dry- and wet-bulb gas temperatures were measured in 
phase 3. In all phases, peak inhalation and exhalation 
breathing pressures were measured. 
Table 5.-BMS metabolic workload for phase 3 
02 consumption rate .............. Llmin . . 1.35 
CO2 production rate ... , ........... Llmin . . 1.10 
Ventilation rate ................... Llmln . . 30.0 
Tidal volume ....•......... , L per breath . . 1.68 
Respiratory frequency ..... breaths per min. . 17,9 
Peak respiratory flow rate: 
Inhalation ..•.. , .............. Llmin . . 89 
Exhalation .......... , ; ........ Llmin . . 71 
BMS Breathingand metabolic simulator. 
Table 5.-Weights and speeds of 
human subjects for treadmill . 
tests, phase 3 
Subject 
A ...... .. 
B ....... . 
C ...... .. 
0 ...... .. 
E ....... . 
F ...... .. 
Weight, kg 
88 
90 
96 
86 
77 
92 
Speed, mls 
1.56 
1.74 
1.65 
1.70 
1.79 
1.74 
In phase 1, the termination criteria were a collapsed 
breathing bag indicating an exhausted O2 source, or aver-
age inhaled gas concentrations of ~4 pct CO2 or ~15 pct 
O2, In subsequent phases, the levels of gas concentrations 
were dropped as termination criteria upon consideration 
that the only positive signal a user would have in actual 
use would be an empty breathing bag. 
4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Experience with each brand of apparatus is discussed 
separately for all phases. The numerical results of phase 1 
have been published previously4 and will not be repeated 
here. The major conclusion for phase 1 was that SCSR's 
that pass their inspection criteria can be expected to func-
tion successfully except for those that have quality control 
problems. In phase 1, apparatus were sent for evaluation 
that were obviously damaged and should have been remov-
ed from service. No performance degradation was experi-
enced that could be attributed to exposure to the mining 
environment. 
For phases 2 and 3, the parameters monitored were 
averaged over the entire test duration and are presented 
graphically (figs. 1-9) for each apparatus by parameter. 
The values for deployed units tested on the BMS are 
compared with the values for new units tested on the BMS 
and with deployed units tested on human subjects on a 
treadmilL Missing data points are indicative of equipment 
malfunction or other anomaly that invalidated the data. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was performed for each 
monitored parameter to determine whether or not the 
deployed units behaved differently from new units. This 
method tests the hypothesis that the two samples are from 
populations with the same mean. The values from both 
samples are ranked in ascending order of magnitude. If 
the sum of the ranks of the smaller sample (T) (in this 
4Kyriazi, N., J. G. Kovac, J. Shubilla, W. Duerr, and J. Kravitz. Self-
Contained Self-Rescuer Field Evaluation: First-Year Results of 5-Year 
Study. BuMines RI 9051, 1986, 12 pp. 
case, new units) falls within an acceptable range for the 
given sample sizes, then there is not sufficient evidence at 
the specified probability level to say that the means of the 
two samples differ. The rank-sum test does not rely upon 
the assumptions that either the baseline or deployed data 
are normal distributions or that they have identical var-
iances, as does the t-test for two populations of inde-
pendent samples. One limitation of the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test is that it does not distinguish between large and 
small differences in values. The results of the two-sided, 
P = 0.05 Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are presented in tables 
7 and 8. The probability of T, the rank sum of the base-
line units, falling outside the given range is 0.05 if the 
populations have the same mean. 
CSE 
In phase 1, one SCSR was rejected because of damage 
(no intact lead seal and rattling of internal components). 
When it was opened, its components fell out. This unit 
should have been removed from service. If there is inter-
nal damage to a CSE apparatus, it may rattle when shako 
en, or the O2 bottle gauge may have shifted, making it 
hard to read. 
When a CSE SCSR is dropped on the lower case latch, 
the case bottom is pushed in, which can puncture the 
breathing bag. Although this can be easily seen, some-
times it is not recognized. Improved training in inspection 
procedures could correct this situation. 
Twenty-five deployed units were successfully tested in 
phase 1. 
Table 7.-Wllcoxon rank-sum ~est results, phase 2 
Av Av Dry.bulb Inhalation Exhalation 
Apparatus Duration inhaled CO2 inhaled O2 temp pressure pressure 
Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T 
CSE ...... 15·41 25 14·38 36 15·41 20 15-41 21 15·41 20 15·40 32 
Draeger ••. 19·57 28 18·54 43 19·57 15 19·57 37 19·57 54 12·45 44 
MSA ..•... 10-35 18 9·33 27 9·33 11 10-35 17 10·35 8 10-35 8 
Ooenco •.• 16·65 32 30-94 94 16·68 34 30-94 70 30·94 62 30-94 64 
PASS ..... 13·50 23 13-50 57 13·53 34 13·53 6 13·53 17 13·50 19 
T Sum of the ranks of the smaller sample (new units). 
Table a.-Wilcoxon rank-sum test results, phase 3 
Av Av Wet·bulb Dry·bulb Inhalation Exhalation 
Apparatus1 Duration inhaled CO2 inhaled O2 temp temp pressure pressure 
Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T 
CSE ...•... 24·72 62 23·69 41 14·58 41 13·53 44 14·55 37 24·72 44 24·72 49 
Draeger •... 24·72 72 24·76 62 24·76 62 23-69 26 14·58 38 17·55 30 24·76 41 
MSA ....•.. 19·56 33 24·56 34 22·53 43 24·56 27 24·56 36 24·56 28 24·56 26 
Ocenco .... 15-60 35 15-60 42 15-60 39 14·58 15 15-60 25 15·60 25 14·58 39 
T Sum of the ranks of the smaller sample (new units). 
lpASS not tested in phase 3. 
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In phase 2, regulators from several SCSR's blew apart 
when their cylinder valves were opened. One incident oc-
curred at an MSHA district office; two more regulator 
bursts occurred in the Bureau laboratory where the tests 
were conducted; another occurred at NIOSH. CSE's re-
sponse to NIOSH was to recall and retrofit the SCSR's 
with a modified regulator. 
The human-subject tests in phase 2 were terminated 
arbitrarily shortly after 60 min for the benefit of the 
human subjects. Those durations are not shown in the 
graphs since the apparatus were not expended at termi-
nation as were the ones tested on the BMS. 
One human subject experienced breathing pressures 
that became so high that he was barely able to complete 
the test. Afterward, the subject was exhausted and be-
came lightheaded. The apparatus was taken to CSE and 
dismantled. No defect could be found in the apparatus, 
but the recorded high pressures, which reached 210 mm 
HzO on exhalation and 280 mm HzO on inhalation, cannot 
be denied. High ventilation rates may have caused the 
high pressures. The human subject is, perhaps, a CO2 re-
actor, who responds to the inhalation of CO2 with exces-
sively increased ventilation. Since the CSE AU-9Al has 
the highest values of inhaled CO2 of any of the apparatus, 
this would explain why he experienced no similar problem 
with the others. 
As in the first phase of this study, a few apparatus were 
sent that should have been removed from service because 
of obvious damage. Some rattled when handled. Usually, 
this rattling indicated that the plastic regulator clamps 
were broken. 
One unit was missing a lead seal and had a paper seal 
that had curled away from the case, revealing the remnants 
of an old paper seal. When it was open~d, the mouthpiece 
was found to be missing. This unit was put into service in 
June 1982, was checked by CSE in December 1982 as part 
of a recall of all its SCSR's, and was collected for this 
study in November 1984. As a result of this finding, 10 
more units were procured from the same mine and were 
inspected. No further problems were discovered. In addi-
tion to the missing mouthpiece, this apparatus had a con-
stant O2 flow rate of 1.47 L/min, which is less than the 
required 1.5 L/min. The expiration date for the unit had 
passed between the time it was collected and tested. This 
is not sufficient reason to excuse the apparatus, but, in 
any case, a low flow rate on the constant-flow regulator is 
easily made up through increased use of the demand valve. 
All of the other CSE SCSR's had O2 flow rates above the 
required minimum. Eleven deployed units were success-
fully tested in phase 2. 
In phase 3, two units that had been procured for the 
study before the recall involving replacement of defective 
regulators vented their O2 bottles when the cylinder valves 
were opened. 
One apparatus that had legally expired 18 months be-
fore it was received was tested in phase 3 for informational 
purposes only. This apparatus had large and small dents 
in the outer case, and one of its paper seals was broken. 
This apparatus had CO2 levels higher than any other, 
with average inhaled values exceeding 4 pct for the last 
20 min beginning at 55 min. According to the manufac-
turer, if the CO2 absorbent, lithium hydroxide (LiOH) , 
absorbs moisture, its efficiency is lessened. If that was the 
case with this particular apparatus, removing an expired 
unit from service can be seen as important. Twenty-two 
deployed units were successfully tested in phase 3. 
DRAEGER 
In a study of Draeger SCSR's carried by MSHA in-
spectors, two units had broken clamps around the flow-
splitting valve housing at the interface of the breathing bag 
and breathing hose. During the simulated escape test in 
which these were discovered, one unit's breathing hose 
separated from its breathing bag, rendering the unit un-
usable. The other unit held together. Draeger recalled its 
apparatus to replace this clamp as well as the nose clip 
clamp, which had also been found to experience some 
breakage. 
One other discovery was that a significant percentage 
of the Draeger SCSR's had breathing hoses that were 
crimped where they were folded for packaging. Uncrimp-
ing the hose is usually simple but should be mentioned in 
the training procedure. Draeger has added this instruction 
to its manual. 
Inspection of 13 units that had been subjected to ex-
plosive forces in the Clinchfield Coal Co.'s McClure #1 
Mine disaster in 1983 showed that even apparatus with sig-
nificant damage performed normally and could have been 
used for an escape. 
There have been two cases in which Draeger SCSR's 
were sent in from various MSHA districts with reports that 
they failed to function properly. Upon testing, the appa-
ratus were found to function normally, implying improper 
use. Improved training procedures may prevent such oc-
currences. Twenty-one deployed units were successfully 
tested in phase 1. 
In phase 2, one apparatus from the McClure #1 Mine 
had sufficient talcum powder in the breathing hose to 
cause mild irritation and to make the test subject want to 
spit. This raises concern that some users may choose to 
abandon the apparatus. Another apparatus, from the 
Ranger Fuel Corp.'s Beckley #2 Mine, had a severely 
crimped breathing hose that could not be uncrimped. In 
addition, talcum powder was visible below the crimp in 
the hose. A frayed waist strap indicated that the apparatus 
had been carried frequently. All other inspection criteria 
were met. It seems that the presence of talcum powder, 
even in copious quantities, is not an effective method of 
preventing the breathing hose from sticking shut. It is an 
effective irritant when inhaled, however. 
One problem that resurfaced in phase 2 was the in-
cidence of broken nose clip clamps. This was no surprise, 
as the apparatus procured for the study were collected 
prior to the recall of the OXY-SR 60B SCSR's. 
Two deployed apparatus had inhalation check valves 
that resonated during inhalation, causing higher inhala-
tion pressures. The same phenomenon occurred on base-
line units. This occurred only at one particular inhalation 
flow rate drawn by the BMS. The phenomenon was re-
producible with human subjects but occurred only at that 
same flow rate. It is unlikely that this phenomenon would 
adversely affect an emergency escape. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test (table 7) for average in-
haled 02 indicates a lower mean value for the new units 
than for deployed units. As can be seen from the O2 
graph (fig. 2), however, the average inhaled 02 values are 
all close. In any case, higher O2 concentration in deployed 
units is not worrisome if the differences are, indeed, real. 
Fifteen deployed units were successfully tested in 
phase 2. 
In phase 3, another unit with a broken nose clip clamp 
was found, indicating that all users have not responded to 
the manufacturer's recall. Three deployed and one new 
apparatus had inhalation check valves that resonated dur-
ing inhalation as indicated on the graphs as the greater-
than-normal inhalation pressures. As before, these pres-
sures would be only intermittent on human subjects and 
would present no problem to the user. 
Also, in phase 3, more complaints were received about 
crimped breathing hoses. After opening 150 Draeger 
SCSR's collected from MSHA inspectors, it was discovered 
that the crimp problem was more widespread and that 
some crimps were difficult to undo. As a result, Draeger 
retrofitted all of its apparatus with new hoses in 1991. 
As can be seen in the inhaled CO2 chart (fig. 7), one 
deployed apparatus had much higher levels of CO2 than 
the others. In an effort to explain this, the data of other 
apparatus tested on the BMS that day were reviewed and 
it was found that the apparatus had normal CO2 values, so 
it is unlikely that the BMS put too much CO2 into the 
circuit. The apparatus was stored on a mantrip, as were 
many others that had normal levels of CO2, It may be that 
a manufacturing error resulted in the apparatus containing 
less chemical than intended. The average inhaled CO2 
level exceeded 4 pet after 66 min. This is high for the 
Draeger OXY-SR 60B but physiologically tolerable and 
no higher than the average of the CSE AU-9A1. In the 
future, apparatus with such abnormal characteristics will 
be disassembled in an attempt to explain their behavior. 
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This apparatus also had· high inhalation pressures due to 
resonating inhalation check valves. 
Twenty-one deployed units were successfully tested in 
phase 3. 
MSA 
In phase 1, it was found that many human subjects 
cough during the first several breaths from MSA SCSR's. 
Although the exact cause is not certain, there are several 
possibilities: 
1. Talcum powder in the breathing circuit, used to keep 
the rubber parts from sticking together. 
2. Potassium superoxide (K02) dust that was not fully 
vacuumed out of the breathing circuit at the time of 
manufacture. 
3. K02 dust that escaped the fIlters of the chemical 
bed resulting from shock and vibration sustained during 
normal use. 
While one case can be attributed to cause 3, most cases 
were attributed to causes 1 and 2 if there was no damage 
to the fIlters or beds. In any case, MSA has applied Warn-
ing stickers to its apparatus advising that, should cough-
ing occur, the apparatus is not defective and should not 
be removed. 
Several early apparatus produced for the Bureau and 
MSHA, and used by MSHA inspectors, were found to 
have internal component frames that were dislocated 
from their shock mounts and were in danger of falling out 
of the lower case halves. This would have made the units 
difficult to use. The condition was caused by one or more 
severe drops; however, no damage to the outer case was 
visible. This problem was resolved in commercially avail-
able models. 
Fourteen deployed units were successfully tested in 
phase 1. 
In phase 2, the only problem found with an MSA SCSR 
was one unit with a chlorate candle that failed to fire, 
necessitating a manual start. Inspection of the unit at 
MSA revealed a missing spring in the firing mechanism. 
This was a quality assurance problem and was reported to 
NIOSH. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test (table 7) on bothinhala-
tion and exhalation pressures indicates lower mean values 
for baseline (new) units than for deployed units. As can 
be seen on the breathing pressures graph (fig. 3), the 
differences are slight. Since the Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
for breathing pressures in phase 3 (table 8) does not show 
a significant difference between new and deployed units, 
increasing resistance does not seem to be a trend. 
I: 
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Eleven deployed units were successfully tested in 
phase 2. 
In phase 3, the apparatus tested on a human subject 
was accidentally run at a workload 30 pct higher than de-
sired; the test was graphed but should not be compared 
with the other tests. Eleven deployed units were success-
fully tested in phase 3. 
OCENCO 
In phase 1, an Ocenco SCSR used in an actual escape 
in the Greenwich Collieries mine fire of 1984 was found 
to have its check valves reversed. This was considered 
to be a quality assurance problem and was resolved by 
NIOSH, MSHA, and the manufacturer. 
The major problems with the Ocenco SCSR are its 
stiff demand valve and its strong outer case. The pressure 
required to elicit 30 L/min of O2 from SOme of the de-
mand valves can reach -200 mm H20, compared with ap-
proximately -40 mm H20 for the CSE demand valve. At 
high O2 use rates (higher than the usual constant flow rate 
of 1.8 L/min), the demand valve is needed. Unless aware 
of the high activation pressure, the User is likely to think 
that the apparatus is malfunctioning. When 12 Ocenco 
SCSR's were used in the Greenwich Collieries mine fire, 
5 testimonies indicated that the users felt that they could 
not get enough air. In response, the users removed the 
mouthpiece or nose clip, breathed around the mouthpiece, 
or slowed down. Training would remedy this problem to 
some degree, but the best solution is to replace this 
demand valve with one that is not as stiff. 
The strength of the clear, outer case of the Ocenco 
SCSR enables it to withstand shock better than its internal 
components. During the Greenwich Collieries mine fire, 
12 of 17 units used for escape evidenced internal damage 
sufftciently severe that, if damage occurred before use (the 
likely case), the apparatus should have been removed from 
service. LiOH from the scrubber was found in the breath-
ing circuits of five of the damaged units. All damage to 
these apparatus was evident, but apparently not recognized 
by the miners, the mine operators, or the mine inspectors. 
Improved training in inspection procedures is obviously 
necessary. 
Another problem is the tight-fitting case halves, which 
are extremely difftcult to open without proper training. It 
is recommended that training include special mention of 
the opening procedure. 
Thirty-eight deployed units were successfully tested in 
phase 1. 
In phase 2, three of five Ocenco SCSR's from the 
Greenwich Collieries #2 Mine failed their inspection cri-
teria and were returned to the mine and traded for appa-
ratus that passed their inspection criteria. One apparatus 
had a shifted bottle band. Another had a cracked case. 
A third had a shifted bottle band and a piece of loose rub-
ber in the case. A fourth had a very scratched case but 
passed its inspection criteria. This apparatus was found 
to contain enough LiOH in its breathing bag and hose to 
cause severe coughing. Some LiOH had even escaped the 
breathing circuit and could be seen through the scratched 
case upon close inspection. It is not believed, however, 
that a user would have detected this even under laboratory 
conditions and certainly not under routine mining condi-
tions. This type of problem-an apparatus that passes its 
inspection criteria but is unusable-is of primary concern 
in the long-term field evaluation. As a result, the manu-
facturer has added an inspection criterion that reads as 
follows: 
"Inspect the apparatus for indications of high force 
impacts. If the view through the case is obstructed such 
that a proper examination cannot be performed (e.g. scuff 
marks, stickers, paint) the unit must be removed from 
service." 
Two of the Ocenco SCSR's had O2 flow rates below the 
required minimum of 1.5 L/min. The measured rates 
were 1.44 and 1.48 L/min; shortfalls of these amounts 
would have minimal effect on use. 
As the flow rate from a normal regulator diminishes 
during a test, the demand valve is activated more often. 
The more the demand valve is activated, the higher the in-
halation pressure becomes because of the nature of the 
stiff demand valve. The variation in regulator performance 
with diminishing O2 flow over time is evidenced by the 
wide range of values for inhalation pressures that can be 
seen in the graphs. Also contributing to this wide range of 
values is the variation in stiffness of the demand valves. 
Twenty-nine deployed units were successfully tested in 
phase 2, 
In phase 3, an apparatus with a missing cylinder neck 
clamp was found. This would not have compromised a 
successful emergency escape. 
On the phase 3 graph for CO2 (fig. 9), there are two 
apparatus with higher-than-average values. High CO2 val-
ues can be attributed to natural variation in the efftciency 
of the CO2-absorption chemical, environmental impact, or 
incorrectly high CO2 add-rate during testing. The appara-
tus were not close in serial number (60627 and 68218), but 
were from the same mine and had the same deployment 
history: first carried in and out of the mine daily for 
28 months, and then stored underground for 10 months. 
The other units from that mine had different deployment 
histories. The apparatus were tested 5 days apart, with 
other apparatus tested between, before, and after that all 
behaved normally, which tends to diminish the possibility 
of an incorrectly high CO2 add-rate while testing. The 
values of the other monitored parameters were normal. 
The fact that both apparatus had the same deployment 
history leads one to believe that the environment or their 
handling had some effect on the CO2-absorbent bed. It 
is not known what type of environmental treatment 
would reduce the efficiency of the LiOH bed. In any case, 
the apparatus had durations of 99 and 104 min, by which 
time the average inhaled CO2 had reached approximately 
4 pct. This would hardly have been noticed by a user, es-
pecially for the brief period of exposure. 
In May 1990, a new unit experienced ignition of the 
Kel-F plastic (homopolymer of chloro-trifluoroethylene) 
valve seat in the O2 cylinder valve when the valve was 
opened. A strong smell of chlorine and/or fluorine ema-
nated from the breathing hose; this would have prevented 
the apparatus from being used in an emergency. Whether 
the ignition occurred because of hydrocarbon contamina-
tion in the valve or a Kel-F plastic shaving, industry 
experience suggests the susceptibility of Kel-F plastic to 
ignition in 100 pct O2 atmospheres. Other manufacturers 
have switched valve seat material from Kel-F plastic to 
Vespel polyimide resin with no further reported problems. 
NIOSH has been notified of the incident. Forty-five 
deployed units were successfully tested in phase 3. 
PASS 
In phase 1, two of the PASS SCSR's, for reasons still 
unknown, underwent a decrease in O2 concentration to be-
low 15 pct, requiring termination of the tcsts. Whcn these 
units were later refilled with O2 at PASS's facility, the O2 
flow rates were found to be in compliance with specifica-
tion. Since other apparatus were successfully tested imme-
diately after their failures, malfunctioning measurement 
equipment was ruled out. One possible explanation is that 
the constant-flow regulators were initially clogged with 
particulate matter that later freed itself. Since these in-
cidents could not be repeated nor the causes determined, 
they were not pursued beyond reporting them to NIOSH. 
One SCSR, during treadmill testing, permitted high 
inhaled CO2 concentrations during the first several 
breaths. It was found that the inhalation check valve was 
missing. This was considered to be a quality assurance 
problem and has been handled by NIOSH. Six deployed 
units were successfully tested in phase 1. 
In phase 2, one unusual occurrence involved a PASS 
SCSR with an extraordinarily long duration (114 min). 
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This is not to say that a user could have worn the unit that 
long, since both average and minimum inhaled CO2 had 
reached 15 pct before that time. It is believed that the 
constant-flow regulator was not releasing its required 
3 L/min of Oz over the first 60 min of use. Since only 
1.35 L/min STPD was removed from the apparatus on 
the simulator test, nothing unusual was noticed untU the 
apparatus performed longer than the usu~ time. After 
60 min, even norm&! apparatus are permitted to have flow 
rates less than 3 L/min, so this postulation could not 
be positively determined. 
In phase 2, all of the baseline (new) units had average 
and minimum inhaled CO2 levels significantly higher 
than those of the deployed units (fig, 5). The dry-bulb 
temperatures for the baselines were also much lower than 
those of the deployed units, indicating that the soda-lime 
beds were less reactive, permitting more CO2 to pass 
through the beds unabsorbed and, thus, producing less 
heat. There are several possible explanations for this 
behavior. Since the baseline units were tested as a batch, 
close in time to each other, approximately 9 months be-
fore the deployed units were tested, it is possible that too 
much CO2 was injected into the units. To test that theory, 
more new units were tested in 1990. They had even higher 
levels of CO2, It was noticed that the baseline units had 
much higher serial numbers than the deployed units. The 
deployed unit serial numbers ranged from 317 to 2689. 
The baseline unit seri&! numbers ranged from 3110 to 
3308. More units of lower serial number were tested and 
both good and bad results regarding CO2 breakthrough 
were recorded. MSHA obtained two units from different 
mines and one from storage at its facility. The two from 
the mines did well but the one from storage had high CO2 
levels. A direct correlation was found, with one discrep-
ancy, between CO2 breakthrough time and canister weight. 
No other correlation has been determined as of this 
writing. 
One unit was rejected because of a cylinder gauge that 
was not visible. Nineteen deployed units were successfully 
tested in phase 2. 
No PASS SCSR's were tested in phase 3 since few re-
main in use and the manufacturer hilS ceased operations. 
The PASS SCSR is no longer considered approved by 
MSHA and NIOSH. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A number of quality control problems were discovered 
in the long-term field evaluation. These problems were 
reported to NIOSH, MSHA, and the breathing apparatus 
manufacturers. In each case, action has been taken to 
solve the problems. 
Certain SCSR's collected during the study were dam-
aged by daily in-mine use and should have been removed 
from service. The damage was generally apparent and 
visible and should have been detected if the SCSR's had 
been properly inspected. Improved inspection training is 
recommended. 
The results of this study suggest that the large majority 
of SCSR's that pass their inspection criteria can be relied 
upon to provide a safe level of life support capability for 
I 
I 
Ii 
i 
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mine escape purposes. No problems have arisen involving 
subtle performance degradation due to the mining en-
vironment. Manufacturing defects or improper design 
were found, such as the CSE bursting regulators and 
missing mouthpiece; the Draeger broken clamps and 
crimped hoses; the MSA defective starter candle and 
coughing problems; the Ocenco reversed check valves, 
burning Kel-F valve seat, and scratched outer case hiding 
internal damage; and the PASS missing check valve, incor-
rectly set regulator, unpredictable high CO2 levels, and 
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still-mysterious low 02 levels. All of the defects were 
detected immediately upon attempting to don the appa-
ratus except for those of the PASS SCSR, which is being 
removed from service. The discovery of a defective ap-
paratus gives the user the opportunity to use another one, 
since usually extra SCSR's are stored. Even with this op-
tion, however, these problems evidence the need for con-
tinued monitoring, preferably by the Government, whose 
independence is important. 
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